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FROM CUSTOMARY LAW TO ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT: A NEW APPROACH TO 
AVOIDING TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL 
DAMAGE BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED 
STATES 
Brian R. Popiel* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Canada and the United States share approximately 5,000 miles of 
border as well as more than 150 rivers and lakes.! Each country is the 
other's largest trading partner.2 Approximately ninety percent of Ca-
nadians live within 100 miles of the U.S. border.3 Because of their 
geographic proximity, and their social and economic similarities and 
interdependence,4 Canada and the United States share a long history 
of effective dispute management that often serves as a model for the 
rest of the international community.5 The countries' past practices and 
current approaches toward dispute management evidence a marked 
preference for cooperative diplomacy over formalized legal resolu-
tions.6 But, regardless of their codependence, Canada and the United 
* Topics Editor, 1994-1995, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 Catherine A. Cooper, The Management of International Environmental Disputes in the 
Context of Canada-United States Relations: A Survey and Evaluation of Techniques and 
Mechanisms, 1986 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 247, 249. 
2 Eric Beauchesne, Paycheques Losing To Inflation, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Dec. 24, 1993, at F1 
(United States is Canada's largest trading partner); David R. Sands, Japan Dominates U.S. 
Trade Complaints, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1994, at B7 (Canada is United States's largest trading 
partner). 
3 Jim Fox, With Canada's Dollar Down, Border Shopping Declines, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 
Dec. 25,1992, at 23A; Anne Swardson, Canada Backs Off In Magazine Content Dispute, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 8, 1993, at B11. 
4 Cooper, supra note 1, at 253. 
5 See id. at 249. 
6Id. at 253. 
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States are continually involved in disputes over activities affecting 
the countries' extensive shared natural resources. 
The traditional approach to dispute management between nations 
such as Canada and the United States has been to impose responsi-
bility on the affecting nation after the damage has occurred.7 This is 
a reactive approach. Recently, however, affected states have turned 
to customary international law principles to impose procedural duties 
on potentially affecting states before damage occurs.8 This approach, 
by contrast, is predominantly proactive. Among the procedural obli-
gations employed in the proactive approach is the duty to assess the 
environmental impact of a potentially harmful activity.9 In both Can-
ada and the United States, Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
procedures are widely accepted in domestic practice.lO Thus, the next 
logical step is for the two nations to apply EIA procedures as a 
bilateral international obligation to prevent one country from causing 
harm to the other. 
This Comment proposes that Canada and the United States require 
international EIAs to prevent transboundaryll environmental dam-
age between the two nations before such harm occurs. Section II 
outlines the gradual progression in international law of the sic utere 
principle. Sic utere stands for the proposition that a nation is respon-
sible for actions occurring within its territory which adversely affect, 
or may potentially affect, the territory of other nations. The sic utere 
principle has progressed from use in customary international law, 
through international agreements, to recent soft-law applications. 
Section III discusses the modern trend of taking proactive measures, 
such as requiring preparation of EIAs, to avoid transboundary dam-
age, rather than relying on the traditional method of resolving dis-
putes with reactive procedures. Section IV focuses on the function of 
the EIA and its domestic implementation in Canada and the United 
States, as well as the application of EIAs internationally. Finally, 
section V explores the potential use of the customary international 
7 Developments in the Law-Internatiorw,l Environmental Law, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1484, 
1493 (1991) [hereinafter Developments]. 
8 See id. 
9 See Nicholas A. Robinson, International Trends in Environmental Impact Assessment, 19 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 591, 591 (1992). 
10 See Constance D. Hunt, A Note on Environmental Impact Assessment in Canada, 20 
ENVTL. L. 789, 790 (1990). In the United States, provisions for EIAs are found in the 1969 NEPA 
legislation. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4332(2)(C) (1988). In Canada, EIA provisions are found in the Government Organization Act 
of 1979. Ch. 13, § 6(1)(a)(ii), 1978-1979 S.C. 314 (Can.). 
11 "Transboundary" is synonymous with "transborder," "transfrontier," "transnational," and 
"extraterritorial" for purposes of this Comment. 
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principle of sic utere to develop an international EIA plan mandating 
the assessment of potential transborder environmental damage be-
tween Canada and the United States. 
II. SIC UTERE: THE DUTY TO AVOID HARMING OTHERS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Though pollution is often perceived as a local or regional concern, 
much pollution freely passes across national borders, thereby making 
its occurrence an international problem.12 Such transboundary pollu-
tion is defined by one commentator as "disturbances that originate in 
one country, are transmitted through a shared natural resource, and 
take effect in another [country]."13 Even where pollution does not 
physically move from one country to another, its cumulative effects 
on individual nations make pollution a global concern, with obvious 
international repercussions.14 Because of pollution's international mo-
bility, pollution protection must derive from international law. 15 Inter-
national environmental law takes three basic forms which ultimately 
reflect its historic progression: customary international law, interna-
tional agreements, and non-binding soft law.16 
International environmental disputes exist when two nations have 
a "conflict of interest concerning ... the alteration and condition ... 
of the physical environment."17 Thus, an international dispute must 
consider customary principles of international law. 18 Under accepted 
principles of international law, the duty to prevent transborder envi-
ronmental damage lies with the country that causes the damage.19 
A. The Sic Utere Principle of Customary International Law 
Customary international law principles provide a basis for develop-
ing other sources of international law such as international agree-
12 See Developments, supra note 7, at 1492. 
13 Stephen C. McCaffrey, Pollution of Shared Natural Resources: Legal and Trade Implica-
tions, in 1977 AM. SOC'y INT'L L. PROC. OF THE 71ST ANN. MEETING 56,56. 
14 An example of such a cumulative effect is global warming caused by thousands of individual, 
local sources emitting high levels of chlorofluorocarbons. Though no single source would greatly 
affect the level of ozone, en mass they affect the whole planet. See Jutta Brunnee, Beyond Rio? 
The Evolution of International Environmental Law, 20 ALTERNATIVES (U. Waterloo (Can.)), 
Nov.lDec. 1993, at 16, 16. 
15 Developments, supra note 7, at 1492; see Brunnee, supra note 14, at 16. 
16 Brunnee, supra note 14, at 16. Soft law is a term used to describe forms of non-binding 
"international co-operation," such as "codes of conduct." Id. at 19. 
17 Cooper, supra note 1, at 249. 
18 See Developments, supra note 7, at 1492. 
19 Id. 
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ments and non-binding soft law.20 In turn, these sources of interna-
tional law have laid a foundation for holding nations responsible for 
causing harm to other nations.21 Customary international law is cre-
ated when nations consistently adhere to a legal principle with the 
belief that they are legally bound by it.22 For example, a majority of 
nations have long believed that the territorial waters of a state extend 
twelve miles from its coastline.23 This custom has been so widely 
accepted that, when the custom was codified at the 1974 session of the 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, no other 
distances were even mentioned as potential territorial water meas-
ures.24 
Similar progressions have occurred in the international environ-
mental legal context. International environmental law is premised on 
a belief in international neighborhood law, a concept which developed 
to remedy the opposing interests of sovereign states.25 Under estab-
lished principles of international law, the obligation to prevent 
transborder pollution is on the state that created the pollution.26 Un-
fortunately, the overarching international law principle of sovereignty 
has caused many problems in the development of customary interna-
tional environmental law.27 The problems stem from the fact that 
different nations vary widely in their commitment to protecting the 
environment.28 For instance, in the Nuclear Tests29 cases, the Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ) issued interim orders requiring France 
to refrain from nuclear testing in the South Pacific because continued 
testing would cause radioactive fallout on Australia and New Zea-
land.30 Rather than answer for its adverse environmental actions, 
France refused to appear before the ICJ, apparently believing it had 
the sovereign right to refuse to do SO.31 
20 See discussion infra parts II.B. and II.C. 
21 See discussion infra parts II.A.-C. 
22 Brunnee, supra note 14, at 16. 
23 See Steven C. Nelson, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to Interna-
tional Law, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 133, 133 (1972). 
24 John R. Stevenson & Bernard H. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea: The 1974 Caracas Session, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 13-14 (1975). 
25 Brunnee, supra note 14, at 16. 
26 Developments, supra note 7, at 1492. 
~Id. 
28 See id.; Brunnee, supra note 14, at 16. 
29 Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C'}. 253 (Dec. 20); (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C'}. 457 (Dec. 20). 
30 Developments, supra note 7, at 1500. 
31 See id. France claimed that it could not make an appearance for military reasons. Id. at 
1502. The ICJ later reasoned that a final decision would be moot because France pledged to 
cease testing. Id. at 1500. 
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In contrast to the notion of state sovereignty, another principle of 
customary international law mandates a conscious effort to avoid 
transboundary pollution. This principle is sic utere tuo ut alienum 
non laedas.32 Translated literally, this common law principle states 
that one must use one's own property so as not to injure that of 
another.33 In the context of customary international law, the principle 
prescribes that "no state may use its territory, or allow the use of it, 
in a way that causes serious damage to the territory of another 
state."34 This principle has been expounded in a series of international 
disputes. 
The principle was first introduced into international environmental 
jurisprudence during the Trail Smelter arbitration in 1938.35 In the 
Trail Smelter arbitration, a specially appointed arbitral tribunal held 
Canada responsible for damages caused to property in the United 
States by a privately owned smelting plant in British Columbia.36 In 
its initial decision, the tribunal drafted a pollution abatement program 
to reduce pollution emissions until a final decision could be reached on 
whether to allow the plant to continue operating.37 In its final decision, 
the tribunal required that the smelter refrain from causing any future 
pollution.38 
The Trail Smelter arbitration dealt with damage, in the form of air 
pollution, caused by a zinc and lead smelting plant privately operated 
by a Canadian company in Trail, British Columbia.39 Sulfur, in the form 
of sulfur dioxide emitted from the plant at a rate of up to ten thousand 
tons per month, fell on areas of northern Washington State between 
1925 and 1937.40 The tribunal found that these emissions caused sub-
stantial harm to forests and farmland in the lumber and agricultural 
region along Washington's Columbia River.41 The tribunal stated in 
dicta that: 
32Id. at 1496. 
33 BALLENTINE's LAW DICTIONARY 1178 (3d. ed. 1969). 
34 Brunnee, supra note 14, at 16. 
35 Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal (United States v. Can.), 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 182 (1939) (initial 
decision) [hereinafter Trail Smelter (initial decision) or (Initial Decision)],Jurther proceedings, 
Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal (U.S. v. Can.), 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941) (final decision) 
[hereinafter Trail Smelter (final decision) or (Final Decision)]. 
36 Final Decision, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. at 716-17. 
37 See Initial Decision, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. at 209-12. 
38 Final Decision, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. at 717. 
39Id. at 688. 
4°Id. at 692-93. 
41 Initial Decision, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. at 198, 201. 
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Under the principles of international law, ... no State has the 
right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as 
to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another ... when 
the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by 
clear and convincing evidence.42 
Accordingly, the tribunal held that Canada was responsible under 
international law for the Trail Smelter, and that it was "the duty of 
the [Canadian] Government ... to see to it that this conduct should 
be in conformity with the obligation of the Dominion [of Canada] 
under international law."43 The Canadian government agreed and 
complied with the decisions of the tribunal at a cost to the Canadian 
smelting company of twenty million dollars.44 
The sic utere principle of international law surfaced again in the 
Corfu Channel case, which was decided by the ICJ in 1949.45 Under 
reasoning similar to that used in Trail Smelter, although not in an 
environmental context, the ICJ determined that if a nation knows 
that harmful effects may befall other nations due to its actions or its 
failure to act, and it does not disclose this knowledge, then that nation 
will be responsible to those who suffer damage.46 
The Corfu Channel dispute arose in 1946 when two British war-
ships were damaged by underwater mines while passing the Corfu 
Strait off the coast of AlbaniaY The strait was determined to be 
within the territorial waters of Albania.48 The ICJ found that because 
Albania had knowledge of the mines, Albania failed in its general duty 
under international law to notify all others of the existence of the 
minefield, and specifically to warn the British ships of the impending 
danger.49 The ICJ grounded its decision in the customary international 
law principle of sic utere.50 
A third case expounding sic utere as a principle of customary inter-
national law is the Lake Lanoux Arbitration of 1957.51 The dispute in 
this case arose out of an attempt by France to divert water from Lake 
Lanoux, a body of water entirely within French territory, situated 
42 Final Decision, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. at 716. 
43 ld. at 716-17. 
44 Alfred P. Rubin, Pollution by Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbitration, 50 OR. L. REV. 259, 
272 (1971). 
45 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 LC.J. 4 (Apr. 9). 
46 See Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 259, 265 (1992). 
47 Corfu Channel, 1949 LC.J. at 12-13. 
48 ld. at 14. 
491d. at 22-23. 
50 See id. at 22. 
51 Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Fr. v. Spain), 24 LL.R. 101 (1957) [hereinafter Lake Lanouxl. 
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near the Franco-Spanish border.52 The diversion of the lake water, 
which normally flowed into the River Carol and ultimately crossed 
the border into Spain, had the potential to affect the supply of water 
to some Spanish towns. 53 Treaties between the two nations required 
notification of the affected nation by the affecting nation if the natural 
course of a river was going to be altered.54 Spain claimed that the 
proposed French diversion would violate these treaties.55 The ap-
pointed tribunal determined that the treaties, together with custom-
ary international law principles, mandated that one state has a duty 
to notify other states when its actions may impede their environ-
mental enjoyment.56 Additionally, the tribunal determined that, when 
planning to take action, one state must take into account the consid-
erations of the other state.57 Here, the tribunal determined that 
France had indeed complied with its obligations, and thus had violated 
neither the treaties nor any international principles of law.58 
The principle of sic utere again returned to the fore in an interna-
tional environmental dispute between Canada and the United States 
in the Gut Dam arbitration of 1968.59 The arbitration came about after 
Canada constructed a dam which spanned the international boundary 
of the St. Lawrence River.60 The dam apparently caused flooding and 
erosion damage to property on the American side of the river, result-
ing in a number of private tort claims.61 The two countries had entered 
into an agreement, prior to the construction of the dam, which con-
tained a provision essentially codifying the sic utere principle.62 The 
provision imposed responsibility and liability on the Canadian govern-
ment for any injury to the interests of the United States caused by 
the Canadian-made dam.63 Thus, based on this agreement, the ap-
pointed tribunal determined that Canada was liable for the damage 
caused to property in the United States.64 
52 See id. at 101--02. 
53Id. 
54 Additional Act of May 26, 1866 to the Treaties of Bayonne (Dec. 1, 1856; Apr. 14, 1862; May 
26, 1866), art. 11, cited in Lake Lanoux, 24 I.L.R. at 103. 
55 Lake Lanoux, 24 I.L.R. at lOI. 
56 See id. at 138; Palmer, supra note 46, at 265. 
57 See Lake Lanoux, 24 I.L.R. at 14I. 
58 Id. at 119, 138-42. 
59 Canada-United States Settlement of Gut Dam Claims (Sept. 27, 1968),8 LL.M. 118 (1969) 
[hereinafter Gut Dam Claims]. 
60 Id. 
6! Id. 
62Id. at 119--20. 
63 Id. 
64 Gut Dam Claims, 8 LL.M. at 136. 
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B. The Codification of Sic Utere in International Agreements 
Customary principles of law, upon their acceptance in the interna-
tional community, may be incorporated into international agree-
ments.65 However, the transposition from customary law principle to 
inclusion in an international agreement such as a treaty is not always 
a fluid one. Even though customary international law may recognize 
a principle because of a general recognition among nations that a 
certain practice is obligatory,66 the principle may still be neglected or 
avoided in practice.67 Thus, for a customary principle to be included 
in an international agreement, the principle must be held in high 
regard by the agreeing nations. The sic utere principle has undergone 
just such a progression from customary international law principle to 
codification in international agreements.68 
The incorporation of a customary principle into an international 
treaty or agreement often serves to balance the contracting nations' 
strong desire to protect their sovereignty, and may also serve to fill 
the gaps left by vague or general customary principles.69 Some argue 
that customary law has no teeth without codification, because states 
can finesse the generalities and vagueness of principles to claim that 
their actions are within the bounds of the international principles.70 
Thus, commentators believe that codification of customary principles 
is necessary to delineate the specifics of an international principle and 
thereby give the customary principle its teeth.71 
Customary law is difficult to codify, however, because the specificity 
needed to espouse a rule is often seen as an impingement on the 
sovereign rights of states.72 This makes states apprehensive about 
binding themselves to such a rule.73 Because states are, at the same 
time, the maker, subject, and enforcer of a rule, the individual inter-
65 See Stevenson & Oxman, supra note 24, at 13-14. 
65 See Palmer, supra note 46, at 266. 
67 See Developments, supra note 7, at 1492. For example, under customary international law, 
states are obliged to prevent transnational pollution. Id. However, efforts to develop a liability 
scheme to regulate transboundary pollution have failed because customary international law 
does not coincide with the interests of individual states. Id. 
68 See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Third United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea, 11th Sess., at 86, U.N. Doc. AlConf. 62/122 (1982) [hereinafter Law 
of the Sea Convention]. 
69 See Brunnee, supra note 14, at 18. 
70 Developments, supra note 7, at 1493. 
71 See Brunnee, supra note 14, at 18. 
72 Developments, supra note 7, at 1492-93. 
73Id. 
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ests of the member states often significantly mold the content of 
international rules.74 Thus, states will often decide not to invoke cus-
tomary international environmental principles to protect themselves 
from the pollution of others, because they fear that a precedent will 
be created, allowing the same principle to be invoked against them 
for their own environmental offenses.75 Perhaps the most glaring 
example of this phenomenon is the 1985 Chernobyl disaster, where a 
nuclear reactor in the Ukraine leaked large amounts of radioactive 
materials. Although more than twenty nations recorded significant 
increases of radioactivity, none brought suit against the Soviet Un-
ion.76 Nations producing nuclear power, or any other form of pollution-
producing power, were in no hurry to set an international precedent 
for the assumption of responsibility for transboundary damages 
caused by such power plants.77 
International agreements, such as treaties, can effectively fill the 
gaps in customary international law by defining specifics in agreed-
upon language within accepted parameters.78 An important agree-
ment addressing the welfare of the world environment was reached 
in Stockholm at the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on 
the Human Environment79 in 1972. The underlying theme of the Dec-
laration asserts that although all nations have a present right of equal 
enjoyment of the environment, they also have "a solemn responsibil-
ity to protect and improve the environment for present and future 
generations."8o To meet these ends, the Stockholm Declaration 
adopted Principle 21, which is based on the sic utere principle. Prin-
ciple 21 reads: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions and the principle of international law, the sovereign right to 
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental 
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within 
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environ-
74 See Brunnee, supra note 14, at 16. 
75 Developments, supra note 7, at 1502 n.63. 
76 [d. at 1499. 
77 See ZYGMUNT J. B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, 
AND SOCIETY 1008-09 (1992). 
78 See Brunnee, supra note 14, at 18. 
79 Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held at Stockholm, 
5-16 June 1972, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. NConf. 48/14 (1972), revised by U.N. 
Doc. NConf. 48/14/Corr. 1 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration]. 
80 [d. at 4. 
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ment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.81 
Although the first clause codifies the customary rule that states have 
sovereignty over their own territory and affairs, the second clause 
recognizes sic utere as an equally important rule of customary law, 
one that requires a nation to monitor actions within its borders to 
ensure environmental protection outside its borders.82 
The Declaration further expands on the notion of sic utere in Prin-
ciple 22.83 Principle 22 asserts that states must cooperate to further 
develop the international law of "liability and compensation for the 
victims of pollution and other environmental damage caused by ac-
tivities within the jurisdiction or control of such States to areas be-
yond their jurisdiction."84 
The twenty six principles and 109 recommendations which consti-
tute the Stockholm Declaration were signed by 103 nations, with 
twelve nations abstaining, and no negative votes.85 Ratification of the 
Stockholm Declaration, however, is not binding on its signatories.86 
Nevertheless, the universal acceptance of sic utere, as expounded in 
the declaration, clearly indicates that compliance with the principle is 
more than expected in the international environmental context.87 In 
fact, Principle 21 itself is now generally recognized as a rule of inter-
national environmentallaw.88 
The Stockholm Declaration is not the only international agreement 
to embrace the sic utere principle. The obligation is also codified in 
Article 194(2) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, a binding treaty which was opened for ratification in 1982.89 
Article 194(2) provides: 
States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities 
under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause 
damage by pollution to other States and their environment, and 
that pollution arising from incidents or activities under their ju-
risdiction or control does not spread beyond the areas where they 
exercise sovereign rights in accordance with this Convention.90 
81Id. at 7. 
82 See id. 
83 Id. 
84 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 79, at 7. 
85 See Palmer, supra note 46, at 266. 
86 Developments, supra note 7, at 1498 n.38. 
87 See ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 130 
(1991). 
88 See id. The Principle has been reaffirmed in several other United Nations declarations. Id. 
89 Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 68, at 86. 
90 Id. 
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Again, the sic utere principle is embraced and codified, making states 
responsible for actions that occur within their territory and damage 
the territory of others. 
Sic utere is also expounded in Article 20 of the Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Convention on the Conservation of 
Nature and Natural Resources.91 Moreover, the principle is included 
in the 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution.92 This Convention is grounded on the belief that the sic 
utere principle is a common conviction among nations as regards 
transborder air pollution.93 The sic utere principle is also enunciated 
in the 1987 Restatement of the Law (Third) The Foreign Relation 
Law of the United States,94 which specifies that a "state is obligated 
to take such measures as may be necessary ... , to ensure that activi-
ties within its jurisdiction or control ... [do not] cause significant 
injury to the environment of another state."95 The application of sic 
utere in the context of international agreements strongly signals that 
the principle is of great importance to nations, even where the concept 
may conflict with notions of sovereignty.96 
C. The Application of Sic Utere in Non-Binding Soft Law 
Aside from customary international law and international agree-
ments, the acceptance of sic utere as an international environmental 
rule can also be expounded through soft-law techniques.97 Any type 
of international agreement that is not legally binding is considered 
soft law.98 Often, soft law comes in the form of "codes of conduct" or 
"soft principles."99 Codes of conduct may follow the terms of binding 
agreements or treaties, but are permissive in that they allow parties 
to participate in an international arrangement without the fear of 
being legally boundYJO Soft principles appear to be coming to the fore 
internationally, but they are not yet considered customary interna-
91 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Agreement on the Conservation of 
Nature and Natural Resources, 15 ENVTL. POL'y. & L. 64, 68 (1985) [hereinafter ASEAN 
Convention]. 
92 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, art. 7(e), 34 U.S.T. 
3043,3047,1302 U.N.T.S. 217, 220. 
93 See KIss & SHELTON, supra note 87, at 131. 
94 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES, §§ 601-04 & introductory note (1987). 
95 [d. § 601(1)(b). 
96 See, e.g., Stockholm Declaration, supra note 79, at 7. 
97 Brunnee, sU'fYT'a note 14, at 16. 
98 [d. at 19. 
99 [d. 
100 [d. at 19--20. 
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tional law.101 As is often the case with new developments in interna-
tional environmental law,l°2 the application of soft-law techniques 
helps to increase international acceptance of those developing princi-
ples.103 
Soft-law applications can work to alter political beliefs that may 
prevail in an area of international law.104 These changes can be cata-
lysts in the development of international environmental law.105 The 
Helsinki Declaration on the Protection of the Ozone Layer is a prime 
example.106 This non-binding international declaration delineated cer-
tain environmental soft principles that ultimately were incorporated 
in "hard amendments"!07 to the legally binding Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. lOB 
Soft law has advanced the sic utere principle through the develop-
ment of a series of rules called the "Rules of International Law Ap-
plicable to Transfrontier Pollution" [hereinafter Transfrontier Pollu-
tion Rules].109 At the Sixtieth Conference of the International Law 
Association, the meaning of the sic utere principle was expounded in 
the articles of the Transfrontier Pollution Rules: 
Article 3 (Prevention and Abatement) 
(1) ... States are in their legitimate activities under an obliga-
tion to prevent, abate and control transfrontier pollution to such 
an extent that no substantial injury is caused in the territory of 
another State. 
(2) Furthermore States shall limit new and increased transfron-
tier pollution to the lowest level that may be reached by measures 
practicable and reasonable under the circumstances. 
(3) States should endeavor to reduce existing transfrontier pol-
101 See id. at 2l. 
Icrl One such developing principle is the concept of "common concern of humankind," which 
may afford the protection of the environment beyond current jurisdictional limitations. Brunnee, 
supra note 14, at 2l. 
103 See id. One commentator notes that soft law is a popular tool because it leaves much to the 
discretion of the parties and is politically convenient. Palmer, supra note 46, at 269. 
1M Palmer, supra note 46, at 270. 
105 [d. at 269. 
106 Helsinki Declaration on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, May 2, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1335 
(1989). 
107 Palmer, supra note 46, at 269-70. 
108 See Montreal Protocol Parties: Adjustments and Amendments to the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, June 29, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 537 (1991); United Nations: 
Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. at 1541, 1550 
(1987). 
109 See Dietrich Rauschning, Legal Aspects of the Conservation of the Environment, Report 
of the Committee, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION REPORT OF THE SIXTIETH 
CONFERENCE 157, 158-77 (1982). 
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lution, below the requirements of paragraph 1 of this article, to 
the lowest level that may be reached by measures practicable and 
reasonable under the circumstances.uo 
459 
Through soft-law techniques, the Transfrontier Pollution Rules have 
effectively employed the sic utere principle, imposing a duty on states 
to avoid causing extraterritorial injury to others.111 
III. REACTIVE MEASURES VERSUS PROACTIVE MEASURES 
There is one glaring problem with the use of the sic utere principle 
as a medium for creating state responsibility: the principle is usually 
invoked as a reactive measure.1l2 This backward-looking approach is 
activated only after the damage has been done to the environment.113 
Furthermore, this approach lacks the capability to address irre-
versible or incompensable environmental problems before such prob-
lems arise.114 Therefore, because the imposition of responsibility after 
the fact fails to prevent the injury in the first place, many commen-
tators posit that the correct approach is to impose procedural obliga-
tions on states before the environmental damage occurs.115 
llO [d. at 160. The Rules continue to evoke proactive measures in the following articles: 
Article 7 (Prior Notice) 
(1) States planning to carry out activities which might entail significant risk of 
transfrontier pollution shall give early notice to States likely to be affected. In particu-
lar, they shall on their oum initiative or upon request of the potentially affected 
States, communicate such pertinent information as will permit the recipient to 
make an assessment of the probable effects of the planned activities. 
(2) In order to appraise whether a planned activity implies a significant risk of 
transfrontier pollution, States should make environmental assessments before car-
rying out such activities. 
Article 8 (Consultation) 
(1) Upon request of a potentially affected State, the State furnishing the information 
should enter into consultations on transfrontier pollution problems connected with the 
planned activities and pursue such consultations in good faith and over a reasonable 
period of time. 
(2) States are under an obligation to enter into consultations whenever transfron-
tier pollution problems arise in connection with the equitable utilization of a shared 
natural resource .... 
[d. at 171-76 (emphasis added). 
111 See Toru Iwama, Emerging Principles and Rules for the Prevention and Mitigation of 
Environmental Harm, in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: NEW CHAL-
LENGES AND DIMENSIONS 107, 119 (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1992) (these principles help prevent 
disputes between an "acting" state and a possible "affected" state). 
ll2 See Brunnee, supra note 14, at 18. 
ll3 See id. 
ll4 [d. 
ll5 Developments, supra note 7, at 1493. 
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Arguably, if procedural requirements are imposed before action is 
taken, states will be better able to address transborder environmental 
problems preemptively through cooperative methods.u6 The potential 
for such cooperation, however, is limited. The greater the differences 
between the cultures and economies of the nations involved in a 
dispute, the more difficult dispute settlement or avoidance will be 
because social and economic differences may weaken the under-
standing between the parties. ll7 Thus, two nations with varied cul-
tures and economies are not likely to give in to potentially restrictive 
proactive measures because the nations' priorities and policies are 
probably too divergent. us The opposite, however, may be true of two 
nations that are similarly situated socially and economically-such as 
the United States and Canada.u9 
There are several types of proactive procedures that can be im-
posed to promote dispute avoidance120 over potential environmental 
damage.121 Among the options are consent, consultation, notification, 
and assessment.l22 Consent is a dispute avoidance procedure whereby 
the acting party must obtain the prior consent of the affected party 
before any action can be taken.l23 The consultation procedure obliges 
the acting party to confer with the potentially affected party before 
proceeding.l24 Notification merely requires the affecting party to in-
form the potentially affected party so that the potentially affected 
party has an opportunity to prepare and adapt to the ensuing 
change.l25 Assessment is a procedure requiring the affecting party to 
evaluate the effects of its proposed action on the potentially affected 
party.l26 Note that assessment entails less involvement by the affected 
party than notification. In turn, notification involves the affected 
116 [d. 
117 See Cooper, supra note I, at 252. 
118 Cf id. at 252, 252 n.21 (differing perceptions and economic objectives between developed 
and developing states make latter suspicious of relatively strict environmental standards advo-
cated by developed nations). 
119 See id. at 298. "In the North American context, Canada and the United States, consistent 
with their history of co-operation, have a quite extensive practice of carrying out these [proac-
tive]procedures." [d. 
120 [d. at 296. 
121 [d. 
122 Cooper, supra note I, at 296. 
123 See id. at 298--99. Between Canada and the United States, the procedure of consent is used 
often to govern actions affecting many of the boundary waters shared by the two nations. [d. 
at 299. 
124 See id. at 299-301. 
125 [d. at 301. 
126 Cooper, supra note I, at 302-03. 
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party less than consultation, and consultation calls for a smaller in-
volvement compared to consent.127 
Although each of these procedures is likely to lead to sound plan-
ning and mitigation of potential problems, and, therefore, to interna-
tional dispute avoidance,128 the first three procedures-consent, con-
sultation, and notification-are contingent upon the implementation 
of the fourth-assessment.129 A potentially affecting state would prob-
ably not ask for the consent of a potentially affected state without 
first assessing and evaluating the project to determine if any environ-
mental harm might occur.130 Accordingly, consultation, or the lesser 
standard of notification, has little value unless an EIA has been un-
dertaken to provide a basis from which to consult, or notify, the 
potentially affected state.131 
One commentator believes the duty of a state to assess the envi-
ronmental effects of its projects is the least controversial of the dis-
pute avoidance procedures.132 This duty to assess environmental im-
pact is "implicit in the substantive international environmental law 
doctrine proscribing the causation of serious environmental injury to 
a neighboring state."133 This doctrine is expressed in the sic utere 
customary law principle and Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declara-
tion. l34 Indeed, it may well be impossible to comply with the sic utere 
principle and ensure against transboundary harm without evaluating 
the potential for damage from actions within a state's territory.135 
Thus, the technique of environmental impact assessment, usually in-
volving the preparation of a detailed environmental impact statement 
(EIS), is becoming an increasingly popular decision-making tool.I36 
When read in a proactive rather than a reactive context, the sic utere 
principle can mandate an assessment by the acting nation of potential 
environmental damage to other nations.137 
127 [d. at 297--302. 
128 See id. 
129 See Iwama, supra note 111, at 120. 
130 See id. 
131 Cf id. (stating EIA is used to determine whether planned activities breach legal obligations 
to prevent transborder pollution; notification, exchange of information, and consultation are 
procedures which employ EIA findings to avoid disputes with affected states). 
132 ALLEN L. SPRINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 145 (1983). 
133 Cooper, supra note 1, at 303. 
134 See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 79, at 7. 
135 [d. 
136 See id.; see also Robinson, supra note 9, at 591 (EIA is employed in more than seventy-five 
jurisdictions worldwide). 
137 See Cooper, supra note 1, at 303. 
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IV. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
Environmental impact assessment is essentially a cost-benefit 
analysis of a planned project.13S EIA is a procedure undertaken to 
ensure that a proposed action will not adversely affect the environ-
ment.139 Although the application of EIA varies greatly from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction, the basic steps in the process are the following: 
(1) pre-assessment or screening of a proposed undertaking to 
determine the likelihood of its having a significant adverse effect 
on the environment; 
(2) if the potential negative impact is significant, the proponent 
prepares an assessment; 
(3) the assessment statement is reviewed by a government de-
partment or agency or a board; 
(4) the public is invited to comment through informal meetings 
or hearings, and through written or oral submissions; 
(5) a recommendation concerning the acceptability of the under-
taking is made to the relevant political authority which decides 
whether or not to authorize the undertaking; and 
(6) if authorized, the undertaking is subjected to detailed regu-
lation which may include conditions imposed as a result of findings 
in the EIA process.140 
The spirit of EIA entails making careful, informed decisions, and 
taking preventative steps to avoid unnecessary environmental dam-
age.14l EIA and the preparation of an EIS are procedures applied to 
government, and sometimes to private actions early in the planning 
stages, long before projects are completed or operationaU42 Essen-
tially, the concept of EIA is based on the notion of looking before 
leaping.143 
Environmental assessment is used to determine whether a project 
will or will not lead to a breach of the legal obligation of the parties 
to prevent unlawful pollution.144 E IA is practiced in many jurisdictions 
worldwide, and can be applied in most areas regardless of the level of 
social, scientific, or economic development.145 No matter what the 
capabilities of the jurisdiction implementing the EIA, however, sev-
eral key positive features are always present.146 
138 See Developments, supra note 7, at 1515. 
139 See Robinson, supra note 9, at 602. 
140 Hunt, supra note 10, at 791. 
141 Robinson, supra note 9, at 593. 
142 Cooper, supra note 1, at 303. 
143 Robinson, supra note 9, at 610. 
144 Iwama, supra note 111, at 120. 
145 See Robinson, supra note 9, at 593. 
146 See id. at 593-94. 
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Because of its adaptability to different forms of government, EIA 
can function in any political system.147 Also, the application and use of 
EIA is spreading quickly, with new users modifying and improving 
on the system invoked by others.148 EIA systems that require public 
notice offer average citizens, as potentially affected parties, an oppor-
tunity to be heard before their environment is adversely affected.149 
A successful EIA includes the gathering of data for decisionmakers, 
often revealing potential environmental problems unanticipated at 
the outset of project development.15o 
There are, however, some negative features of E IA.151 For instance, 
the value of EIA is often difficult to establish in a jurisdiction unfa-
miliar with EIA because of an inherent institutional resistance to 
change.152 Indeed, some have opposed EIA, maintaining that it is an 
expensive, time-consuming ploy to hinder development.153 Further-
more, EIA may pose a risk to governmental authority and fairplay. 
Because successful opposition to a proposal through EIA procedures 
may result in the demise of the project, government proponents may 
try to avoid or circumvent the procedures.l54 
Traditionally, EIA has been used only in large projects, thus reflect-
ing a desire to achieve administrative efficiency instead of universally 
applying EIA techniques.155 Some United States jurisdictions, how-
ever, have evolved to require EIA in all projects, large or smalU56 
These jurisdictions realize that even small projects have the potential 
to create environmental harm.157 
Another common negative feature of EIA is that it is not always 
successfuU58 Because post-project monitoring is rare, it is often 
difficult to determine if an EIA accurately anticipated all the impacts, 
147 [d. 
148 [d. at 594. 
149 [d. 
150 Robinson, supra note 9, at 594. 
151 See id. at 594-96. 
152 [d. at 595. This is especially true in developing countries where EIA is often labeled as an 
"anti-development" process. [d. 
153 [d. 
154 See id. One commentator goes so far as to predict that EIA requirements create "a 
perverse incentive for [parties] to whitewash environmental dangers in their assessments," and 
the requirements even risk frustrating political campaigns, because if the EIA really can trigger 
resistance to a project, the acting party "will likely minimize in the report the magnitude and 
risk of harm that such activity might truly threaten." Developments, supra note 7, at 1516. 
155 Robinson, supra note 9, at 596. 
156 See id. 
157 See id. In California and New York even some small villages must follow EIA procedures. 
[d. 
158 [d. 
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or whether mitigation plans actually were successful.159 Thus, it is 
necessary to measure the accuracy of E IA in order to create a better, 
more effective process, and to increase the success rate of EIAs in 
preventing environmental harm.16o 
The typical E IA both gathers information and suggests remedial 
measures.l6l The EIA process is designed to allow authorities to make 
informed decisions.162 One does not have to look too long for an exam-
ple of what can happen when there is a failure to prepare an environ-
mental impact assessment-Egypt's High Aswan Dam offers a glar-
ing example. As a result of not conducting proper studies of potential 
negative environmental impacts, the High Aswan Dam created enor-
mous adverse effects in Egypt.163 The construction of the dam led to 
a variety of problems: the creation of a sharp increase in the incidence 
of blood disease due to a waterborne parasite; the salination of farm-
ing acreage to the extent that the land is now agriculturally useless; 
the destruction of the area's entire sardine fisheries; and huge erosion 
problems in the once fertile and prosperous delta.164 Even though the 
project was undertaken with good economic intentions, the lack of 
knowledge and concern about the possible environmental conse-
quences resulted in widespread disaster.165 
A. EIA in Canada 
EIA is broadly accepted in all Canadian jurisdictions.166 The proce-
dure has been applied federally, provincially, and territorially in Can-
ada since 1973.167 The application of environmental assessment in 
Canada was largely influenced by the passage of the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)168 in the United States. NEPA 
contained provisions for EIA.169 At different political levels, require-
ments for EIA may vary, sometimes pursuant to legislation (provin-
159 Robinson, supra note 9, at 596. 
160 See id. 
161Id. at 606. 
162Id. at 607. 
163 I d. at 595. 
164 See George D. Appelbaum, Comment, Controlling the Environmental Hazards of Inter-
national Development, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 321, 322-28 (1976). 
165 Gary M. Ernsdorff, Comment, The Agency for International Development and NEPk A 
Duty Unfulfilled, 67 WASH. L. REV. 133, 133 (1992). 
166 Hunt, supra note 10, at 790. 
167 See id.; Robinson, supra note 9, at 598. 
168 The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1988 & 
Supp. IV 1992). 
169 See Hunt, supra note 10, at 790--91. NEPA's EIA provision is 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988). 
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cially) and sometimes pursuant to policy directives (federally).170 Be-
cause Canada is much less litigious than the United States, the courts 
have played only a modest role in the development of EIA in Can-
ada.l71 
In the last two decades, Canada has consistently reviewed and 
refined the EIA process.172 Several organizations were developed to 
partake in this process, and to implement EIAs.173 Canada's Environ-
mental Assessment and Review Process (EARP) was established in 
1973174 by cabinet directive.175 EARP controls all federal proposals.176 
EARP was an administrative office until the 1979 Government Or-
ganization Actl77 authorized the Minister of the Environment to un-
dertake and coordinate governmental impact assessment programs 
for new federal projects, programs, and activities.178 The Minister was 
also empowered by legislation to create EIA guidelines for federal 
departments and agencies.179 These guidelines were issued in 1984 as 
the Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Or-
der.l80 
Aside from EARP, several other bodies exist whose function is to 
further develop the EIA process. In 1984, the Minister of the Envi-
ronment created the Canadian Environmental Assessment Research 
Council in order to develop and improve the E IA process in Canada.181 
The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) helps to 
develop EIA worldwide, especially in developing countries.l82 Also, 
the Federal Environmental Assessment and Review Office (FEARO) 
is an important independent body which approves the EARP rules 
governing the various departments both internationally and domes-
tically.l83 
170 Hunt, supra note 10, at 790-9l. 
171 [d. at 792. 
172 Robinson, supra note 9, at 598. 
173 Hunt, supra note 10, at 793-95; Robinson, supra note 9, at 598-99. 
174 Hunt, supra note 10, at 793. 
175 [d. 
176 Robinson, supra note 9, at 598. 
177 Government Organization Act, 1979, ch. 13, 1978-1979 S.C. 313 (Can.). 
178 Ch. 13, § 14(6)(1)(a)(ii), 1978-1979 S.C. at 314. 
179 Ch. 13, § 14(6)(2), 1978-1979 S.C. at 314-15. 
ISO Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order, 118 C. Gaz. Pt. II 2794 
(1984) (Can.)[hereinafter Guidelines Order]. 
181 Robinson, supra note 9, at 598. 
182 [d. CIDA has been involved in the development plan for marine and coastal resources in 
Indonesia. [d. 
183 [d. at 599. 
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The application of EARP, as delineated in section 3 of the Guide-
lines Order, calls for a self-assessment process under which the initi-
ating department, early in the planning stages, must fully consider 
the environmental implications of any project over which it has 
authority.l84 Where the environmental implications are significant, the 
proposal must be referred to the Minister for public review by an 
Environment Assessment Panel.185 The initiating department is the 
decision-making authority and is thus required to screen all projects 
advanced by the project proponents for potential adverse environ-
mental effects, and to make a determination whether the project must 
be publicly reviewed by the Environment Assessment Panel,186 The 
initiating department reports all decisions, whether referred to the 
Panel or not, to FEARO for publication.187 
Public review of a proposal may be ordered if the project would 
create significant environmental harm.l88 Review before the Panel 
may be ordered if there is high public concern about the proposal, 
even if the potential harm seems insignificant.189 If a review is so 
ordered, the Minister appoints a Panel, usually chaired by the Execu-
tive Chairman of FEARO, and made up of three to seven objective, 
knowledgeable, and credible members.19o A public review must entail 
a study of the environmental effects of the project as well as the 
"directly related social impacts of those effects."191 
As the EIA proceeds to a public review, FEARO is responsible for 
delineating the scope of the EIA in a "terms of reference" document.192 
The document is issued by the Minister of the Environment, and the 
Panel meets with the proponent of the project and the public to 
determine the preparation of an EIS.193 Once the EIS is prepared by 
the proponent, it is made available to the public by the Panel, and is 
open for oral or written comment or criticism.194 The Panel then pre-
pares a report of its findings and recommendations for the Minister 
184 Guidelines Order, § 3, 118 C. Gaz. Pt. II at 2795. 
185 [d. 
186 Robinson, supra note 9, at 598-99. 
187 [d. at 599. 
188 Guidelines Order, §§ 11-13, 118 C. Gaz. Pt. II at 2796-97. 
189 [d. 
190 See Guidelines Order, §§ 21-23, 118 C. Gaz. Pt. II at 2798-99; Robinson, supra note 9, at 
599. 
191 Guidelines Order, § 25(1), 118 C. Gaz. Pt. II at 2799. 
192 § 26, 118 C. Gaz. Pt. II at 2799. 
193 Robinson, supra note 9, at 599. 
194 [d. 
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of the Environment and the head of the initiating department.195 
These parties then make the findings public, and the initiating depart-
ment makes a decision on the project. l96 
In Canada, private citizens have the right to sue for violations of 
EIA procedures.l97 There have been two major suits that have had a 
profound effect on the application of EIA in Canada.198 The first case, 
Canadian Wildlife Federation Inc. v. Minister of the Environment 
(Canadian Wildlife 1)/99 was brought by opponents to the Rafferty 
Alameda Project.200 The project involved dams to be built by a pro-
vincial corporation on the Souris River Basin which is situated at the 
borders of the provinces of Saskatchewan and Manitoba and the state 
of North Dakota.201 Canadian citizens' groups sued, alleging a violation 
of EIA requirements, because the project was licensed by the federal 
Minister of the Environment without an EIA being undertaken by 
EARP.202 The court found that the project would affect the environ-
ment in areas under federal jurisdiction, and thus the government had 
to assess the project.203 Moreover, the court found that the Guidelines 
Order was not merely a policy, but was in fact an enactment or 
regulation, thereby equating it to legislation.204 
The second case, Canadian Wildlife Federation, Inc. v. Minister of 
the Environment (Canadian Wildlife II),205 was essentially a further 
attack on the Rafferty Alameda Project.206 After the decision in Ca-
nadian Wildlife I, the government performed two assessments, but 
only one allowed public comment as required by EARP.207 The second 
assessment was not open to public comment, and shortly after it was 
turned over to the Minister of the Environment, he granted the 
195 Guidelines Order, § 31, 118 C. Gaz. Pt. II at 2800. 
196 §§ 31(2), 33, 118 C. Gaz. Pt. II at 2799. 
197 Robinson, supra note 9, at 599. 
198 See Hunt, supra note 10, at 797, 799. 
199 Canadian Wildlife Federation, Inc. v. Minister of the Environment (Canadian Wildlife I), 
3 F.C. 309 (1989) (Can.), aff'd, 4 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 1 (F.C.A. 1989) (Can.). 
200 Canadian Wildlife I, 3 F.C. at 312-13 (1989). 
201 Id. 
202 See id. at 313. 
203 Id. at 323-25. 
204 I d. at 326. 
205 Canadian Wildlife Federation, Inc. v. Minister ofthe Environment (Canadian Wildlife II) 
1 F.C. 595 (1990) (Can.), aff'd, 6 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 89 (F.C.A. 1990) (Can.). 
206 See Canadian Wildlife II, 1 F.C. at 596 (1990). 
207 Canadian Wildlife II, 6 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) at 94--95. 
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project a second license.208 Therefore, the plaintiffs in the second suit 
again argued that the EIA procedures were not followed.209 
The Federal Court in Canadian Wildlife II found that the Minister 
should have allowed public comment on the second assessment.210 The 
court ordered this to be done pursuant to EARP, even though the 
project was now substantially underway, because the license had 
already been granted.211 If the Minister failed to comply, the court 
ordered that the license would be quashed.212 This second case re-
sulted in the opening of the EIA process to judicial scrutiny,213 thus 
ensuring closer compliance with the EARP guidelines, or, upon failure 
to comply, permitting the actions to be attacked.214 
B. EIA in the United States 
The United States Congress enacted the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969215 in response to increasing concern over environ-
mental damage in the United States.216 NEPA provides that present 
generations owe a duty to protect the environment for the long-term 
enjoyment of future generations.217 To reach this end, Congress made 
NEPA applicable to the planned projects and activities of all federal 
agencies.218 In so doing, Congress also delineated NEPA's broad goals, 
requiring that: each generation be a trustee of the environment for 
future generations;219 that all Americans be assured safe, healthy, 
enjoyable surroundings;220 that the broadest spectrum of beneficial 
uses of the environment be attained, without harm or risk to health 
or safety;221 that important aspects of national heritage be pre-
served;222 that a high standard of living for all be achieved by balanc-
208 See id. 
209 Id. at 108. 
210 I d. at 103. 
211 Hunt, supra note 10, at 800-01. 
212 Canadian Wildlife II, 6 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) at 98, 115; Hunt, supra note 10, at 80l. 
213 See Hunt, supra note 10, at 80l. 
214Id. 
215 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). 
216 Ernsdorff, supra note 165, at 137; Geoffrey Garver, Note, A New approach to Review of 
NEPA Findings of No Significant Impact, 85 MICH. L. REV. 191, 191 (1986); see Maria C. 
Holland, Comment, Judicial Review of Compliance with the National Environmental Policy 
Act: An Opportunity for the Rule of Reason, 12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 743, 755 (1985). 
21742 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1) (1988). 
218 Ernsdorff, supra note 165, at 137. 
219 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1). 
220Id. § 4331(b)(2). 
221Id. § 4331(b)(3). 
222 Id. § 4331(b)(4). 
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ing population and resource use;223 and that the quality of renewable 
resources and the recycling of depletable resources be enhanced.224 
NEP A's policy considerations aside, the main influence of the Act 
has been its procedural requirement.225 As outlined in § 4332 of the 
Act, the statute imposes a duty upon federal agencies to account for 
their implementation of the national policy.226 The statute requires the 
agencies to follow NEPA procedures in all instances, unless the action 
falls within the categorical exception of having no significant impact 
on the environment.227 
NEPA gets its strength from its "action-forcing" provisions.228 The 
first such requirement of a federal agency under NEPA is the prepa-
ration of an environmental assessment (EA) to consider the environ-
mental impact of a proposa1,229 Generally, an EA involves an overview 
of the necessity of the project, the impact it may have on the environ-
ment, and any possible alternatives to the proposal-and if there are 
alternatives, their environmental impacts.23o Based on the EA, the 
agency decides whether to prepare an environmental impact state-
ment, or to declare a Finding Of No Significant Impact (FONSI).231 If 
a FONSI is prepared and submitted for evaluation, the agency must 
make it available to the public for review.232 
Agencies must prepare an EIS whenever a major federal project 
will significantly impact the human environment.233 The EIS is meant 
to provide the public and the decisionmakers with a complete record 
of the significant environmental impacts of a proposal, as well as any 
reasonable alternatives.234 Moreover, the EIS is meant to ensure that 
agencies adhere to NEPA policies.235 Nevertheless, the EIS require-
ment is procedural only. Thus, its findings do not force an agency to 
reach any particular decision as to the continuation or termination of 
a project.236 
223 [d. § 4331(b)(5). 
224 [d. § 4331(b)(6). 
225 Ernsdorff, supra note 165, at 138. 
226 Holland, supra note 216, at 758. 
227 Council on Environmental Quality, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (1993). 
228 Garver, supra note 216, at 192. 
229 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3(a). 
230 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)-(b). 
231 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(c)-(e). 
232 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(e)(1)-(2). Unfortunately, significant impacts that may have been revealed 
by an EIS will remain hidden until the damage actually occurs. Garver, supra note 216, at 193. 
233 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988). 
234 Ernsdorff, supra note 165, at 138; see Holland, supra note 216, at 758. 
235 Ernsdorff, supra note 165, at 138. 
236 [d. at 138-39. 
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To assist in the development of and compliance with EA procedures 
NEPA also called for the establishment of the Council on Environ-
mental Quality (CEQ).2~7 Aside from its oversight duties, the CEQ 
also makes recommendations and evaluations on environmental issues 
to the Executive Office of the President.238 Its main responsibility is 
to establish regulations that further NEP A's procedural require-
ments.239 The CEQ's interpretation of NEPA is essentially viewed as 
binding administrative law240 following the Supreme Court's state-
ment in Andrus v. Sierra Club241 that the "CEQ's interpretation ... 
is entitled to substantial deference."242 
In some ways, the CEQ is analogous to Canada's FEARO, in that 
each of these bodies plays a role in the promulgation of the rules for 
environmental assessment.243 Despite Congress's intended role for the 
CEQ, however, much of NEPA has been interpreted by the judici-
ary.244 
The EIS requirement carries with it a presumption that, once an 
agency is faced with all the data, the agency will not partake in any 
project that will likely cause significant environmental harm.245 The 
public disclosure element furthers this presumption because it essen-
tially opens the agency to public criticism and review, and forces the 
agency to consider all environmental factors.246 Public scrutiny is con-
sidered so important247 that regulations require agencies to "encour-
age and facilitate public involvement in decisions."248 
The EIS itself must be a "detailed statement"249 with enough infor-
mation to allow for proper evaluation.250 The statement must show a 
good faith effort by the agency to make a full disclosure.251 The EIS 
must be comprehensive in its assessment of environmental impact, 
237 Garver, supra note 216, at 195. 
238 Holland, supra note 216, at 758. 
239Id. at 759. 
240 Robert P. Frank, Comment, Delegation of Environmental Impact Statement Preparation: 
A Critique of NEPA's Enforcement, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 79, 87 (1985). 
241 Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979). 
242 I d. at 358. 
243 Robinson, supra note 9, at 599. 
244 Holland, supra note 216, at 759. 
245 Id. at 769. 
246 Robert Orsi, Comment, Emergency Exceptions From NEPk Who Should Decide?, 14 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 481, 491-92 (1987); see Holland, supra note 216, at 770. 
247 Ernsdorff, supra note 165, at 139. 
248 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(d) (1993). 
249 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988). 
250 Holland, supra note 216, at 777. 
251 Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 893 (1st Cir. 1979); Holland, supra note 216, at 777. 
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but not conclusory.252 Also, it must provide any possible alternatives 
to the proposal,253 to promote sensible agency decisionmaking.254 The 
final EIS must be made available to the CEQ and the public.255 Once 
the final EIS is complete, the agency has satisfied NEPA's require-
ments.256 
C. International E IA 
The procedure of environmental impact assessment has been 
prominent in the domestic law of many countries for decades.257 At 
least one commentator feels EIA is also becoming a rule of customary 
international law as well.258 EIA has the ability to enforce the inter-
national prohibition against a state acting to harm the environment 
of another state, as delineated in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Dec-
laration.259 
Many international organizations and some nations have taken this 
into account, and have begun implementing EIA internationally. The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development (OECD), for 
example, encourages the use of EIA by states helping developing 
countries.260 The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
also adopts EIA as a principle,261 and the United Nations General 
Assembly endorses EIA.262 
Transboundary environmental assessment is also developing in in-
ternational agreements. EIA was established as Article 206 of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.263 Similar provi-
sions also exist in the 1976 Convention on the Protection of Nature in 
252 Holland, supra note 216, at 777. 
253 [d. at 778. An EIS should include discussion of: (1) a no-action alternative; (2) different 
methods of reaching the objective; and (3) methods of partial satisfaction of the objective which 
are less environmentally harmful. NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834-38 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
254 Holland, supra note 216, at 781. 
256 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988). The same is also true for a Finding of No Significant Impact 
(FONS!). Holland, supra note 216, at 772. 
266 Frank, supra note 240, at 86. 
257 KISS & SHELTON, supra note 87, at 147. 
258 See Robinson, supra note 9, at 602. 
259 [d. at 603. 
260 Developments, supra note 7, at 1514; see Robinson, supra note 9, at 603. 
261 KIss & SHELTON, supra note 87, at 147. The UNEP Principles of Conduct, relating to 
shared natural resources, specifically contain EIA provisions in regard to bilateral or regional 
relations. [d. 
262 Robinson, supra note 9, at 603. The use of EIA is expressly called for in The World Charter 
of Nature, which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. [d. 
263 Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 68, at 89. 
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the South Pacific,264 and in the 1985 ASEAN Convention on the Con-
servation of Nature and Natural Resources.265 
The European Economic Community (EEC) has also acted in favor 
of environmental assessment.266 A prior assessment principle has been 
recognized among EEC members, and EIA, concerning both public 
and private projects, has been delineated in an EEC Council Direc-
tive.267 All member states are required to follow the Council Direc-
tive.268 
In 1991, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
negotiated an agreement on international EIA.269 Under the agree-
ment, the parties must consider a project's size, location, and environ-
mental effects and try to eliminate or limit adverse transboundary 
impact.27o There are also provisions for responses from other states, 
dispute settlement procedures, and post-project monitoring.271 
Both Canada and the United States have advanced the notion of a 
duty to assess transboundary environmental impact by requiring do-
mestic EIAs to include assessments of potential extraterritorial 
harm.272 In 1983, Canada issued a guidelines order73 for its Environ-
mental Assessment Review Procedure requiring that the "external" 
environmental effects of a federal project be fully considered.274 In 
1979, President Carter issued Executive Order No. 12114275 which 
required that an EIS be prepared for all major federal actions that 
may significantly affect the environment outside United States terri-
tory.276 However, the order's many exemptions and exceptions have 
allowed agencies to circumvent it.277 
264 KISS & SHELTON, supra note 87, at 148. 
265 ASEAN Convention, supra note 91, at 64. Article fourteen of the ASEAN Convention 
states that any proposed activities which may have significant effects on the environment shall 
be assessed before they are adopted, and the results of this assessment shall be taken into 
account in the decision-making process. [d. at 67. 
266 Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 87, at 149. 
267 Council Directive 85/337 1985 O.J. (L 175) 40. 
268 Treaty Establishing The European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 189, 298 
U.N.T.S. 11, 78-79. 
269 Robinson, supra note 9, at 607. The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in 
a Transboundary Context was signed at Espoo, Finland on February 25, 1991. [d. at 608. 
270 [d. 
271 [d. 
272 Develapments, supra note 7, at 1514. 
27ll Guidelines Order, 118 C. Gaz. Pt. II at 2794. 
274 § 4(1)(a), 118 C. Gaz. Pt. II at 2795. 
276 Executive Order No. 12114,3 C.F.R. 356 (1979). 
276 3 C.F.R. at 357-58. 
277 See Sue D. Sheridan, Note, The Extraterritorial Application of NEPA Under Executive 
Order 1211;',13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT. L. 173,215 (1980). 
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United States courts have not looked favorably upon extraterrito-
rial EIA. In Greenpeace USA v. Stone,278 for example, a federal dis-
trict court in Hawaii held that the United States Army's role in 
removing chemical weapons from West Germany did not warrant an 
EIS.279 The court was influenced by considerations of foreign policy 
and sovereignty, but stated that other circumstances might produce 
a different result.280 
However, plaintiffs trying to explore these other circumstances 
have found them to be fruitless as well, as the recent case of Public 
Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representative2B1 attests. 
The plaintiffs in this case sought a declaration under NEPA requiring 
the defendant to prepare an EIS for negotiations of the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).282 The suit initially failed on a 
standing issue,283 but was brought again after the NAFTA agreement 
was actually signed.284 The Federal District Court for the District of 
Columbia found in favor of the plaintiffs,285 but the D.C. Court of 
Appeals reversed.286 The court held that NAFTA was a direct act of 
the president, not a final agency action carried out by an arm of the 
executive branch.287 Therefore, NEPA did not require an EIS.288 Be-
cause the signing of N AFTA was a direct act of the president, the 
court felt that the decision to sign could not be questioned.289 
A plan to incorporate EIA to resolve environmental controversies 
between Canada and the United States is not without precedent. 
Domestic evaluation of extraterritorial environmental impact already 
exists under § 115 of the United States Clean Air Act,290 the United 
States Federal Water Pollution Control Act,291 and § 23(1) of the Clean 
278 Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990), appeal dismissed, 924 F.2d 175 
(9th Cir. 1991). 
279 [d. at 761. 
280 [d. 
281 Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 782 F. Supp. 139 
(D.D.C.), ajJ'd, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
282 [d. at 140-41. 
283 [d. at 144. 
284 Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C.), 
rev'd, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), eert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994). 
286 [d. at 30. 
286 Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 550 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993), eert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994). 
287 [d. at 553. 
288 [d. 
289 See id. 
290 42 U.S.C. § 7415 (1988). 
291 33 U.S.C. § 1320(a) (1988). 
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Air Act of Canada.292 These statutes permit the review of "domestic 
pollution control standards if and when ... domestic-based pollution" 
creates a danger to persons in a foreign country.293 The end result of 
these statutes is to create more stringent pollution control meas-
ures.294 They have the potential to help create the foundation for an 
all-encompassing transboundary environmental impact assessment 
plan between Canada and the United States. 
V. ApPLYING SIC UTERE PROACTIVELY TO MANDATE 
INTERNATIONAL EIA BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED 
STATES 
A. Sic Utere as a Proactive Measure 
Sic utere is a principle of customary internationallaw295 which, when 
applied in an environmental context, states that no nation may permit 
the use of its territory to cause environmental damage to the territory 
of another state.296 It is a principle that has been applied many times 
in cases and arbitration,297 international agreements,298 and non-bind-
ing, soft-law rules or codes.299 Most arbitration and case law has ex-
pounded the sic utere principle as a reactive measure to find state 
responsibility.soo However, the Lake Lanoux Arbitration seems to 
employ sic utere, in part, as a proactive measure, by stating that the 
principle mandates a duty to notify.30l The principle has also been 
espoused as a proactive measure in other instances. For instance, the 
Transfrontier Pollution Rules302 effectively employ the sic utere prin-
ciple to impose a duty to prevent extraterritorial injury, and to take 
proactive measures to avoid transboundary pollution.303 In particular, 
the rules call for a potentially affecting state to give prior notice to a 
292 Clean Air Act, R.S.C., ch. C-32, § 23(1) (1985) (Can.). 
298 Cooper, supra note 1, at 306. 
294 [d. at 307. 
295 See Brunnee, supra note 14, at 16. 
296 See Trail Smelter (final decision), 35 AM. J. INT'L L. at 716. 
297 See discussion of Trail Smelter arbitration, Corfu Channel case, and Lake Lanoux arbitra-
tion, supra section II.A. 
298 See discussion of the Stockholm Declaration, and the Law of the Sea Convention, supra 
section II.B. 
299 See discussion of the Transfrontier Pollution Rules, supra section II.C. 
300 See discussion of the Trail Smelter arbitration, Corfu Channel case, Lake Lanoux arbitra-
tion, and Gut Dam Claims, supra section II.A. 
301 See discussion of the Lake Lanoux arbitration, supra section II.A. 
302 See Rauschning, supra note 109, at 158. 
303 See id. at 160-68. 
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potentially affected state, to consult with that state, and to assess the 
environmental impact in that state, before any environmental harm 
occurs.304 
The sic utere principle can better serve the environment if it is 
interpreted and applied as a proactive measure. In other words, the 
principle should be read to require necessary impact assessment, 
international cooperation, and dispute avoidance rather than dispute 
resolution.305 In this light, sic utere could be employed to supersede 
the more frequently used, and inherently confrontational, reactive 
systems of dispute management and remediation.306 
This application of sic utere is logical when one considers the past 
and present outlook on dispute management between Canada and the 
United States. The history of this relationship displays a strong pref-
erence for a more cooperative and pragmatic approach, rather than 
the formal and restrictive devices of legal settlement.307 This prefer-
ence is understandable given the geographic proximity and the eco-
nomic and social similarities between the two nations.308 Thus, two 
countries on good standing with one another, and with few serious 
differences between them, have the potential to effectively invoke 
proactive measures of environmental protection. Canada and the 
United States can apply such measures without fear of creating mis-
understandings or violating protective notions of sovereignty.309 
B. How Sic Utere Mandates EIA 
When sic utere is employed as a proactive measure, the principle 
asserts that a state should not permit its territory to cause environ-
mental harm to another state.310 In order to fulfill this mandate, pre-
ventable environmental harm must be avoided. It follows then, that 
to prevent adverse effects, one must anticipate them before they 
occur. Such foresight can only be realized by assessing the potential 
environmental impact of a proposal before any action is undertaken.3ll 
304 See id. at 171-76. 
305 See Iwama, supra note 111, at 119-20. 
306 See Developments, supra note 7, at 1493; Brunnee, supra note 14, at 18. 
307 Cooper, supra note 1, at 253. 
308 Id. 
309 See id. at 298. But see Developments, supra note 7, at 1501-02 (stating that most nations 
refuse to submit to any reactive or proactive measures for fear of even partial relinquishment 
of sovereignty). 
310 See discussion of the Transfrontier Pollution Rules, supra section II.C. 
311 See Robinson, supra note 9, at 602. 
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Environmental impact assessment is essentially a procedure which 
analyzes the costs and benefits of a project,312 and helps to ensure that 
an action will not adversely affect the environment.313 In both Canada 
and the United States, EIA is a widely accepted domestic practice.314 
The United States pioneered the practice of domestic EIA315 by in-
cluding a provision for environmental impact assessment in the N a-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969.316 Since 1969, more than 
seventy-five jurisdictions worldwide have required EIA by law.317 The 
passage of NEPA and its EIA requirement in 1969 greatly influenced 
Canada. So swayed was Canada, that today all Canadian jurisdictions, 
at the federal, provincial, and territorial levels, have imposed EIA 
requirements.318 
C. The International EIA Plan 
Canada has based its EIA procedures largely on the United States 
model created by the NEPA legislation.319 Understandably then, 
many provisions are similar in both countries' domestic EIA imple-
mentation.320 Both share several vital EIA provisions including initial 
assessment by the project proponent; allowance for public scrutiny; 
and the ability to alter or terminate the project based on the 
findings.321 Accordingly, with this similar foundation already in place, 
the implementation of an international EIA agreement between Can-
ada and the United States is readily attainable. 
The sic utere principle, expounded as a proactive measure, can form 
the customary international law foundation for such a bilateral agree-
ment. Inclusion of the principle within a binding agreement will give 
sic utere some legal teeth. From there, the countries can establish 
initial procedures for an international E IA plan. The initial proce-
dures could include the lowest common denominator provisions-
those found in both countries' domestic EIA procedures-of the two 
systems already in place. From this juncture it will be necessary to 
312 See Developments, supra note 7, at 1515. 
313 See Robinson, supra note 9, at 602. 
314 Hunt, supra note 10, at 790. 
315 Cooper, supra note 1, at 304; Robinson, supra note 9, at 591. 
316 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988). 
317 Robinson, supra note 9, at 591. 
318 Hunt, supra note 10, at 790. 
319 See id. 
320 See discussion of EIA in Canada, and EIA in the United States, supra section IV.A.-B. 
321 Hunt, supra note 10, at 791. 
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fill in the blanks left by the differing provisions of each country's 
procedural steps. 
A large stumbling block in negotiations over which procedural 
steps to follow likely will be the provision concerning who makes the 
determination whether to allow, alter, or terminate a project once the 
environmental impact statement has been completed and the public 
has had an opportunity to review the EIS. Determination by an 
agency from the proponent nation may lead to bias espoused by 
notions of state sovereignty. However, if the decisionmaker is from 
the opponent nation, its determination may reflect an over-protective 
approach favoring its home state. Therefore, it appears that the best 
choice may be a neutral agency or committee, similar to the Interna-
tional Joint Committee (IJC), which settles boundary water disputes 
between the two nations, and whose members are appointed by both 
the Canadian and United States governments.322 
An initial EIS could be reviewed by an agency from the proponent 
nation, through FEARO in Canada and the CEQ in the United States. 
Then, a committee similar to the IJC could be established to act as 
the final arbiter in determining whether a project is approved, 
modified, or rejected. The members of the committee would be ap-
pointed in equal numbers by both nations, not as representatives of 
their governments, but as individuals in a "collegial" body, similar to 
the IJC.323 Thus, neither country need fear relinquishing its authority 
to the committee. Like the IJC, the group could have technical ex-
perts and advisory boards at its disposal to facilitate its decisionmak-
ing.324 For this system to work, however, both countries' judiciaries 
must give broad deference to committee decisions. This, along with 
an appeals process, could be outlined in a bilateral agreement. 
Another obvious problem in implementing an international EIA 
plan is that of jurisdiction. In Canada, both federal and provincial EIA 
procedures have been developed,325 while the United States must 
contend with the federal NEPA and state "little NEPAs."326 However, 
both governments have issued orders applying EIA to actions affect-
322 The International Joint Committee (IJC) was established by the Boundary Waters Treaty 
of 1909 between Canada and the United States to manage disputes over transboundary waters. 
Cooper, supra note 1, at 254-55. 
323 See id. at 255. 
324 See id. 
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ing territory outside their respective nations.327 Therefore, both na-
tions could simply designate a single EIA, comparable to those that 
already exist, to be valid in all jurisdictions.328 All jurisdictions would 
be bound by this system concerning international EIAs, but states 
and provinces would be free to impose varying procedures domesti-
cally. 
Another important problem to consider involves determining which 
actions will fall within the scope of the bilateral agreement. The issue 
of scope has been much litigated in the United States.329 Rather than 
being caught up in determinations between whether a project is a 
federal, state, or provincial action, the agreement could simply define 
its scope to include any proposed action that may potentially cause 
extraterritorial environmental damage. The agreement, and later the 
governing committee, could also delineate minimum thresholds of 
harm which, if surpassed, would invoke the use of EIA under the 
agreement. Such a definition would necessarily encompass private as 
well as public actions, again relying on the sic utere principle.330 
A final factor to consider is the implementation of post-assessment 
monitoring.331 Its absence is often considered a main weakness in 
otherwise effective EIA processes.332 Post-assessment monitoring en-
sures that an approved or altered project follows its intended path, 
or incorporates any changes ordered by the decisionmaker.333 This 
process could probably best be administered by agencies designated 
by the nations, perhaps as satellites to the decision-making commit-
tee. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
With ever increasing populations, vast quantities of shared natural 
resources, increased production, and reduced trade barriers, Canada 
and the United States are faced with a multiplicity of environmental 
concerns both domestically and internationally. Fortunately for these 
two nations, they also share a long history of cooperation and cama-
raderie. Therefore, it is in their continued best interests to further 
327 See Environmental Assessment and Review Procedure Guidelines Order, 118 c. Gaz. Pt. 
II 2794 (1984) (Can.); Executive Order No. 12114,3 C.F.R. 356 (1979). 
328 See Robinson, supra note 9, at 609. 
329 Holland, supra note 216, at 767. 
330 See Trail Smelter (final decision), 35 AM. J. INT'L L. at 716--17. The sic utere principle was 
applied to find state responsibility, even though the polluter was a private entity. See id. 
331 See Hunt, supra note 10, at 808. 
332 [d. 
333 [d. 
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this friendship, and set an example of teamwork and conviction, by 
establishing a bilateral agreement to address the problem of extra-
territorial environmental damage. 
By grounding the agreement on customary international law prin-
ciples such as sic utere, Canada and the United States can develop a 
plan to avoid environmental harm before it begins. With the imple-
mentation of an international environmental impact assessment proc-
ess, potential damage can be anticipated and addressed before further 
harm is allowed to deteriorate an already battered ecosystem. 
First-world nations must begin to take a forward-looking approach 
concerning the world environment. If we do not adopt preventative 
measures, no other nations will. A proactive, cooperative, and even-
handed international EIA agreement makes sense because, not only 
does it help to preserve the health and welfare of the people, it also 
provides a model that others may follow. Deep-rooted notions of sov-
ereignty must be pushed to the side. In their place must come posi-
tive, proactive steps such as the proposal outlined here. Reactive 
measures may allocate responsibility, but they do not repair the en-
vironmental damage. Nations like Canada and the United States must 
quickly come to the fore in an effort to minimize, if not avoid alto-
gether, environmental harm. Otherwise, it may soon be too late to 
correct the damage already done. 
